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CRIMINAL LAW
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
BARRY M. FOX*

"Whatever may once have been the case, it is
not doubtful now that the Constitution, and notably the First Amendment, reaches inside prison
walls. The freedoms of conscience, of thought and
of expression, like all the rest of life, are cramped
and diluted for the inmate. But they exist to the
fullest extent consistent with prison discipline, se-

without power to supervise prison administration
or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or
regulations." 4 Courts have justified the doctrine
procedurally by citing the separation of powers of
the judicial and executive branches.- In cases involving state prisoners in federal courts the decisions have rested on considerations of federalism

curity and 'the punitive regimen of a prison ....

as well. 6 Courts and commentators have variously

BACKGROUND

AND

'

1

HISTORY

TMY DEMISE OF TIlE "HANDS-OFF" DOCTINE

Until quite recently judicial review of prisoners' complaints, including those protesting
abrogation of first amendment rights, have been
almost universally avoided by the courts for a
combination of reasons commonly termed as a
group, the "hands-off" doctrine2 In many jurisdictions the hands-off rationales, often in modified
forms, remain the basis of decisions limiting prisoners' rights.3 The doctrine states that "courts are
* A.B., 1965, Johns Hopkins U.; J.D., 1969, Harvard
U. Cooperating attorney, New York Civil Liberties
Union and Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Fox
presently does health and corrections research for the
New York City Rand Institute.
I Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
2
The phrase is said to have originated in FRITcH,
CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PPsoN laImATs 31 (1961).
Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 n. 20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb & Singer]. For the origins,
formulations, and effects of the doctrine see Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Complaints of
Convicts]. See generally Goldfarb & Singer at 181-84;
Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:The Developing
Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
3See, e.g., Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012
(N.D.Ga. 1968), aff'd per cauriam, 393 U.S. 266 (1969).
Recent cases sometimes modify the "hands-off"
doctrine to exclude review of all matters of prison
administration unless these administrative powers were
exercised in a clearly arbitrary or abusive manner. See,
e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th
Cir. 1969); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74
(4th Cir. 1964); U.S. v. Blierly, 331 F. Supp. 1182, 1184
(W.D.Pa. 1971); United States ev rel. Cobb v. Ma-

roney, 216 F. Supp. 910, 911 (W.D.Pa. 1963). Cf.
United States ex rel.
Hoge v. Maroney, 211 F. Supp.
197, 198 (W.D.Pa.), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel.
Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311 F.2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert.
denied,
372 U.S. 931 (1963).
4
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). See also Stroud v. Swope,
187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) ("Ilt is not the
function of the courts to superintend the treatment
and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only
to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally
confined."); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th
Cir. 1949) ("The court has no power to interfere with
the conduct of the prison or its discipline....");
Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706, 707 (M.D. Pa.
1949) ("nor is it within the province of the courts to
superintend the treatment of prisoners in penitentiaries, or interfere with the conduct of prisons or their
discipline.").
6.See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782,
789 (9th Cir. 1965) ("The federal prison system is
operated in all its aspects by... the executive branch
of the government, and not by the judiciary ....);
Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F. 2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955)
("The control of federal penitentiaries is entrusted to
the Attorney General.. . who, no doubt, exercises] a
wise and humane discretion in safeguarding the rights
and privileges of prisoners.... ."); Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952); Powell v. Hunter,
172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Lewis v. Gladden, 230
F. Supp. 786, 788 (D.Ore. 1964) ("iT]he administration
of penal institutions is for the executive, rather than
the judicial, branch of our Government.") (The case
involved a state prison); Complaints of Convicts at

515-16.
6See, e.g., Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545 (9th
Cir. 1966); Gurczynski v. Yeager, 339 F.2d 884, 885

(3d Cir. 1964); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632,
640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Oregon
ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th
Cir. 1957); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 562 (7th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955). See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,- The
Developing Law, supra note 2, at 985-87. See also

Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
a.ff'd per curiam, 445 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Rules
and regulations concerning prison discipline and
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attributed the doctrine to such underlying judicial
considerations as the lack of judicial expertise in
penology7 or in the administration of prisons, the
fear that judicial intervention will subvert prison
disciplineI and the apprehension that judicial
efforts to review prison officials' treatment of
prisoners might open a 'Tandora's Box" leading
to judicial supervision of every aspect of prison
life.9
The hands-off doctrine has been greatly weakened in recent years, 0 and its underpinnings have
been found wanting. The separation of powers
argument is inconsistent with administrative law
doctrine. In similar situations involving the constitutionality of the actions of administrative
agencies, courts have rarely precluded judicial
review, even in cases where enabling statutes labeled the action by the administrator "final." n
Indeed in recent years judicial review has been expanded to many new areas of administrative decision-making.1 2 In the area of first amendment
security are matters of state concern and federal
courts will not inquire into them unless in exceptional
circumstances."); Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502, 504
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1960).
7Cf. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). This basis for "hands-off" is often
suggested, rather than stated. See, e.g., Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Peretz v.
Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706 (Mf.D. Pa. 1949); Commonwealth ex rd. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566,
168 A.2d 793 (1961). See generally Goldfarb & Singer
at 181-82.
"See, e.g., Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
9See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (Tamm, J., concurring in the result).
10
See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text. See
also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (allegation in
state prisoner's suit brought under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was denied permission
to purchase certain religious publications, and denied
privileges accorded other prisoners, solely because of
his religious beliefs, held to state a cause of action).
"See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114,
119-20 (1946); Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817,
822-23 (2d Cir. 1967), noted in 81 HtARv. L. R1v. 685
(1968). See generally 4 K. DAvis, AnDmNmTRATIVE LAW

TREAmTsE 28.10-.15 (1958); L. JAE FE, Jun CIAL CoNTROL o ADMInmsTRA'vE AcTION 595 (1965).

2E.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare rights). In Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294,
1301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court spoke to the
question of judicial review of the decisions of a parole
board restricting the first amendment rights of parolees:
But it is urged that the [Parole] Board's action is
outside the court's power of review. It would be
surprising, and gravely questionable, if Congress
had meant to confer such final authority upon any
administrative agency, particularly one that makes
no pretense to learning in constitutional law. It
would be bizarre to hold.., that assertions of

rights in particular, the judicial mandate to review
administrative action is nearly absolute:
Broadly speaking, agency action attacked on constitutional grounds Could be immune from judicial
review, if ever, only by the plainest manifestation
of congressional intent to that effect." ... But

the case against such immunity is clear in the domain of the First Amendment. 5
In Brown v. Peyton,14 a case in which Black Muslim inmates claimed violations by prison officials
of their first amendment rights to freedom of
religion, the Fourth Circuit recognized the necessity for courts to review the decisions of prison
administrators to insure that the constitutional
rights of inmates are protected:
[P]rison officials are not judges. They are not
charged by law and constitutional mandate with
the responsibility for interpreting and applying
constitutional provisions.... We do not deni-

grate their views but we cannot be absolutely
bound by them. 15
Similarly, considerations of federalism cannot
properly be asserted when violations of constitutional rights are claimed by state prisoners. 6 As the
Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. Avery, 17 a
case involving the constitutional right of access to
court of Tennessee prisoners: "There is no doubt
that discipline and administration of state detenconstitutional rights like those made here may be
overridden without ever being faced and decided
by any tribunal of any kind.
The court went on to say that "the fundamental issues
of constitutional

law are

considered... as... es-

sentially identical [for parolees and prisoners]." Id. at
1304 n.8.
13Id. at 1302. The court quoted from Gonzalez v.
Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Courts
often label first amendment freedoms "preferred
rights." See, e.g., Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821,
824 (D. Neb.), af'd sub nom. Rowland v. Jones, 452
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).
14437
F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).
15 Id. at 1232. See also Muniz v. United States, 305
F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), a9'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963):
"But a mere grant of authority [over prisoners, granted
to the Bureau of Prisons] cannot be taken as a blanket
waiver of responsibility in its execution. Numerous
federal agencies are vested with extensive administrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that their
actions are immune from judicial review."
16 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 771-72
(N.D. Cal. 1971). See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.
105, 109 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a.ff'd per curiam sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Nolan v.
Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1969). Cf. McNeese
v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963).
17393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969). See also Bland v. Rogers,
332 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D.D.C. 1971).
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tion facilities are state functions. They are subject
to federal authority only when paramount federal
constitutional or statutory rights intervene."
Legitimate constitutional complaints of inmates
are always paramount to state claims of federalism.
The underlying reasons given for the hands-off
doctrine-that courts lack expertise in the administration of prisons or in penology, that court
intervention in the prisoners' rights area will subvert prison discipline, or that judicial review of
prisoners' complaints will open a "Pandora's Box"
of litigation--seem equally unpersuasive. Although
it is true that judges usually lack experience in
running prisons, they also lack experience in
running welfare offices, schools, or draft boards,
but they have intervened in these areas in the past
when constitutional rights were at stake. 8 Courts
traditionally meet such problems by use of expert
witnesses.
The argument for judicial intervention in the
correctional area, assuming questions of constitutional magnitude have been raised, is, in fact,
much more persuasive than in the cases of the suggested analogies, in that the judiciary is intimately
involved in the correctional process. The courts
are responsible for the presence of every man
assigned to sentenced institutions. 9 Furthermore,
judges not only decide through bail setting and
parole procedures which pre-trial defendants are
incarcerated and which are released, but in many
jurisdictions they also retain control over the defendants throughout the period of pretrial incarceration. 20 Judges have also traditionally made
sentencing decisions on the basis of presentencing
reports which are replete with psychological and
sociological factors about defendants, factors presumed relevant to penological prescription. As a
result, the sentencing procedure itself may be
viewed as a fundamental part of the treatment, as
well as the punishment of an offender. To deny
the judiciary review of the treatment of an offender after making such a primary "rehabilita18See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d
803 (2d Cir. 1971) (schools); Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16,
372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) (draft boards).
1'This kind of follow-up responsibility has been
acknowledged in a few instances by courts. Complaints
of Convicts at 516 n.55. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann,

321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); People ex rel.
Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725,
21520 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 500.10.4,
510.10 (McKinney 1971).
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tive" decision is inconsistent. To further make
judicial review of prison administrative decisions
an exception to the general presumption of reviewability of administrative action is highly
illogical.
The argument that judicial intervention,
through abrogation of the hands-off doctrine,
2
would undermine prison discipline is unrealistic. 1
The argument fails to take into account that
prison officials need not fear court intervention
unless the complained of administrative acts or
regulations infringe the constitutionally protected
rights of inmate complainants. Even if the inmate's litigation is successful, the time lag between
punishment for the prohibited act and eventual
judicial vindication is too great to encourage the
inmate to disobey the jailer's directives. Furthermore, in analogous circumstances courts have required that complainants first comply with official
directives, though they consider them to be improper, and then sue on their rights.n Finally, the
inmate knows that he will suffer short-term punishment for the prohibited act, even though he
eventually wins his court suit.
While judicial abstention on prisoners' rights
issues is one method of avoiding the problem of a
plethora of litigation requiring judicial review of
numerous narrow issues concerning the day-today activities of inmates, it is not a constitutionally acceptable means of doing S0.23 Rather,
the constitutional mandates of the first amendment
are better served by carefully laid out standards
which protect the inmates' rights while at the
same time promoting the appropriate state interests, including the minimization of frivolous litigation. Recent cases rejecting simple but unjust
resolutions of inmate complaints have set out such
standards.
EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD USED TO WEIGH
PRISONERS' FRIST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Access to courts was the first area in which
courts broke with the hands-off doctrine.u This
21See Complaints of Convicts at 522; Goldfarb &
Singer at 182.
22 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.
1953). See also People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261,
279 P. 1008 (1929) (Alleged brutality of prison camp
custodian held not to justify prisoner's attempted escape).
21 Cf. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 549, quoted
in text accompanying note 154 infra. See also notes
24-43 infra and accompanying text.
24 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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series of cases at once created precedent for prisoners' rights while ensuring inmates access to the
courts for assertion of these rights. 25 The first case
to suggest important limitations on the hands-off
doctrine was Coffin v. Reichard.26 In that case, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit established
the basic standard by which many future prisoners' rights cases would be decided:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary
implication, taken from him by law."

prison administration in letters to his family, the
standard was expressed thus:
(A]ny prison regulation or practice which restricts
the right of free expression that a prisoner would
have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must
be related both reasonably... and necessarily
...
to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment3 1

In Nolan v.Fitzpatrick,"2 a recent First Circuit
case which concerned the right of inmates to send
letters to the press, the court divided the "justifiaHowever, though this standard dearly recognized ble purpose[s] of imprisonment" into purposes of
that prisoners possessed constitutional rights, it the criminal law and purposes of prison administraleft available a broad basis for the denial of many tion. In the former category the court listed the
rights. Imprisonment expressly takes away freedom generally recognized goals underlying our penal
of movement. Courts have ruled that, at the same system: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and
time, it impliedly takes away other rights con- security of the public (restraint). The purposes of
sidered necessary for or consistent with, the pur- prison administration include those aspects of imposes or "underlying considerations" of imprison- prisonment made necessary by the existence of the
penal system itself: the security of prisoners and
ment."
The Coffin standard has been modified and guards (sometimes more broadly stated as mainclarified in succeeding years. In its newer form, tenance of internal institutional order) and the
the standard has often been applied to review re- minimization of the expenses of prison administrastrictions on first amendment rights. 29 In Carothers tion. Courts have accepted the need for various
v. Folletle,5 a case involving the punishment of a limitations on the first amendment rights of
prisoner for including statements critical of the prisoners on the basis of claims of prison officials
that one or more of these purposes would be
2
1See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-86
served.3
(1969); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966);
Recently, several courts have given much
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941); United States v. Simpson, greater force to the Carothersstandard by requiring
436 F.2d 162, 166-70 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Burns v.
Swensen, 430 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1970); Nolan prison officials to define and relate specific purv. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1970); Gittle- poses of imprisonment to specific restrictions on
macker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 7 (3d Cir. 1970); Mc- inmates' rights.U Previously, a mere general allegaDonough v. Director, 429 F.2d 1189, 1192 (4th Cir.
1970); Conway v. Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307, 1308 (9th tion by prison officials that a restriction was reCir. 1970); Wimberly v. Field, 423 F.2d 1292 (9th lated to the purposes of imprisonment had been
Cir. 1970); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1969); Beard v. Alabama Board of Corrections, 413 sufficient to justify the restriction.
F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1969); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d
Other courts have set out a "balancing of in788 (6th Cir. 1967); Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905,
907 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966). See terests" test which is broader than the "justifiable
generally Goldfarb & Singer at 183.
purposes" test of Carothers:
26 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945).
1Id. at 1024 (footnote and citations omitted).
2143 F.2d at 445.
s'451 F.2d 545, 548-50 (1st Cir. 1971).
23In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) the
3 Even courts granting first amendment rights to
Supreme Court stated: "Lawful incarceration brings inmates have stated that these goals and purposes are
about the necessary withdrawal or limitations of many the basis for some restrictions on inmates' first amendprivileges and rights, a retraction justified by the con- ment rights. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d
siderations underlying our penal system." See also 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228,
Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. 1231 (4th Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
CALIF.
L. Rxv. 407, 410-12 (1967).
1014,1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Morales v. Schmidt,
2
9 See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541
340 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.Wis. 1972) (inmate has free
(5th Cir. 1968); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, speech right to write love letters to his wife's sister).
108-09 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom. See also Complaints of Convicts at 515-26.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Carothers v.
S4 See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
(4th Cir. 1971); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294,
1305 & n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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[T]he asserted interest of the State in enforcing
its rule is balanced against the claimed right of the
prisoner and the degree to which it has been infringed by the challenged rule [or official action].3 5
Courts have found "state interests" to be much
the same as the "justifiable purpose[s] of imprisonment" in the Carothersstandard as enunciated in
the Nolan decision. Unlike the Carothersstandard,
in reviewing the constitutionality of prison regulations or of the actions of prison officials the
balancing of interests test considers the importance
of the infringed inmate right and the level of the
infringement, in addition to the importance of the
state interest or purpose supporting the regulation
or official action. This difference between the tests
is particularly important when first amendment
rights are at issue, because these rights have been
given great emphasis by past and present case
law. 6 Indeed, courts employing the balancing of
interests test in reviewing inmate complaints have
stated that when first amendment rights have
been infringed, the burden on prison officials to
justify restrictions is especially heavy, requiring a
showing of the "most compelling" state interest*
In an important parallel development several
courtsn s citing as precedent earlier non-prison
cases,"9 have held that the purposes of imprison31Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp 105, 109 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); aff'd per curiam sub noma.Younger v. Gilmore
404 U.S. 15 (1971). See Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F.
Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ("[P]rison rules must
bear a reasonable relationship to valid prison goals, and
rules which infringe upon particularly important rights
will require a proportionately stronger justification [citing Gilnore]"). See also Knuckles v. Prasse, 435 F.2d
1255, 1257 (3d Cir. 1970); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d
995,6 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
' See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'7See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529,
541 (5th Cir. 1968); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp.
821, 824 (D. Neb.), affid sub norn. Rowland v. Jones,
452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See
generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
3a See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000-01
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541
(5th Cir. 1968); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776, 786, 788 (D.R.I. 1970).
" See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960): "[Elven though the government purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." Note that this requirement would reach
judicially or legislatively mandated withdrawal of
constitutional rights of inmates, as well as administrative actions resulting in such withdrawal or limitation
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ment, including restraint, must be achieved
through means which least restrict the first amendment rights of those incarcerated.
Taken together, the "balancing of interests" and
"least restrictive means" tests suggest the fairest
future approach for reviewing the first amendment
rights of prisoners. The former test permits first
amendment rights of inmates to be restricted only
when a compelling state interest is served in a
meaningful way by the restriction and the corresponding burden on first amendment rights is not
too great. The least restrictive means test complements the balancing test. It requires that in cases
in which some infringement of inmates' first amendment rights is necessary to achieve important
penological goals, the level of infringement be as
small as possible. And when these goals, though
compelling and though served by the infringement,
can also be achieved without infringing these rights,
40
the goals must be so achieved.
The two tests are the same or similar to tests
used by many courts in the past to review infringements on the first amendment rights of free citizens.4 ' They are the best tests for defining inmate
first amendment rights as well. As the court stated
in Rowland v. Sigler:
The 'sensitive tools' [required to draw the line
between legitimate and illegitimate speech] do not
change merely because the context of enforcement
is a prison. Upholding of a subjugation of preferred First Amendment rights by deferring to the
of rights. See also Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). The same least
constitutionally restrictive alternatives test would seem
to require that punishment necessary to maintain
internal discipline should also avoid constitutional
deprivations so far as possible.
40 Some courts have used the "least restrictive
means" and "balancing of interests" tests interchangeably, letting either one function for both. However,
though the two are closely related, each does serve a
distinct purpose. Thus, the state interest behind a
particular action or regulation might support some
restriction on inmates' first amendment rights but the
action or regulation might still be unconstitutional
because it was not the least restrictive means of achieving that state interest. Conversely, although certain
actions may be the least constitutionally restrictive
means of achieving a particular state interest, the interest itself might not be compelling enough to justify
any restriction on inmates' first amendment rights. In
prisoners' rights cases a few courts have begun to use
the two tests together. See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d
995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.
Supp.
41 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970).
See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S.
728, 737 (1970) (balancing of interests test); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (least restrictive means
test).
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discretion of the prison warden by means of a
'hands-off" doctrine falls short of the duty of a federal court. Ttis does not mean that the circumstances
peculiarto prison confinement are irrelevantin applying the First Amendment tests. It does mean that
the strict tests should not be abandoned to the less
precise rules that were developed to prevent undue
intrusioninto state penal affairs.
The Rowland court concluded:
It is obvious ... that mere imprisonment physically
hinders speech and the exercise of religious acts, and
the need of the state to imprison justifies the limitations on speech and religion to the extent that the
limitations are unavoidable. The burden is on the
state, however, to show a pressing need for imposing
any particular restraint sought to be imposed beyond
those inherent in the mere fact of imprisonment. 2
FIRST A

ENDmENT RIGHTS OF SENTENCED

PRISONERS
After access to courts, the next area of prisoners'
rights recognized by the courts was that of freedom
of religion." Indeed, until quite recently religious
freedom had been the only first amendment freedom explicitly recognized by the courts. Other
judicial rulings granting inmates greater freedom
of speech, assembly, or mailing privileges were
based primarily on some other constitutional protection: access to court, 45 religious freedom, 46 equal
protection or freedom from discrimination. 47 A
series of recent decisions has now created a definite
area of first amendment rights for inmates in

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

*

Although outside of prison religious freedom has
received no greater protection than have other
first amendment freedomsy for many years religious freedom has received more sympathetic
treatment from courts reviewing the actions of
prison officials than have the other "preferred
freedoms" of the first amendment. 0 This is at
least partly due to an assumption, by courts as
well as prison administrators, that religious belief
is an important step towards rehabilitation." The
tranquil acceptance of this and other assumptions
have in recent years received their most serious
test due to the increasing popularity within prisons
of the Black Muslim religion. Unusual both for its
doctrines, which include that of black racial
supremacy,2 and for its ministry and congregation,
which include large numbers of inmates and exinmates," this single religion has been responsible
for much of the litigation concerning religious freedom in prisons.
In non-prison cases, state discrimination against
a religion based on illegitimacy of the religion has
always been viewed as highly suspect by the reviewing courts." Though often pointing out its
unusual features, courts have recognized Islam as a
legitimate religion both in prison and in society at
large. 5 ' Even when recognizing a religion's legitimacy, however, courts have distinguished between
an absolute right to religious belief as opposed to a

49See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531
(1945) ("The First Amendment gives freedom of
addition to that of religious freedom.
mind the same security as freedom of conscience....
Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
4327 F. Supp. 821, 827 (D. Neb.), aff'd sub norn. The grievances for redress of which the right of petiRowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971) (em- tion was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are
phasis added).
not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of
"327 F. Supp. at 824. This paper will discuss limita- free speech and a free press are not confined to any
tions on first amendment rights of inmates imposed by
field of human interest.").
prison administrators, which, though justified as
0See Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of
necessary to achieve a particular goal of the criminal - Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rigls, 62 CoLJm.
law or to advance some purpose of prison administration,
L. REv. 1488, 1500 (1962).
usually go beyond "those [restraints] inherent in the
51See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1230-31
mere fact of imprisonment." See notes 44-169 infra (4th Cir. 1971); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995,
and accompanying text. It must be recognized, how1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Comment, supra note 50, at
ever, that there is a gray area between some of these 1500.
restrictions on first amendment rights and those that
2See Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 819-20 (3d
are unavoidably linked to incarceration.
Cir. 1968); Note, 75 HAnv. L. Rnv. 837, 838-39
4"See Goldfarb & Singer at 216-18; Note, Con(1962). See generally C. LINCOLN, TaE BLACK MusIas

stitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
supranote 2, at 997-1001.
5 See, e.g., Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
46See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir.
1968).
47 See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th

Cir. 1968).

48 See notes 84-169 infra and accompanying text.

IN A

icA (1961).

See Comment, supra note 50, at 1491.
"See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
86-87 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940).
"See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th
Cir. 1971); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370,
373 (D.D.C. 1962). See also Clay v. United States, 403
U.S. 698, 700-01 (1971).
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qualified right to religious activity. 56 Yet such a
distinction is often a difficult one to make in reality. A guarantee of belief without a guarantee of
the corresponding practice is barren indeed. 57 One
reason that Muslims have run into severe problems
in prison is that the practices of the religion are so
at odds with normal prison procedure. For example,
Muslim dietary law requires a pork-free diet, yet
in most prisons pork-cooked food is included at
every meal.
Unfortunately, a majority of cases supporting
religious freedom in prisons are based on equal
protection of the law, rather than on a finding of
first amendment right to religious practice in
prison. 2 The implication of these rulings is that
even if prison administrators may not discriminate against the practice of a particular religion,
there is no guarantee that they may not limit
the practice of all religions, so long as they do
so equally. Nor do these cases hold even the
right to equal treatment of religions to be absolute.
Under these rulings, if prison officials can make an
affirmative showing that the religious sect in question abuses the right to gather and worship, reasonable limitations may be imposed. 9 Furthermore, the opinions have stated that considerations
of security or administrative expense may justify
otherwise discriminatory limitations on the religious activity of a particular sect, even absent any
60
such abuse.
56 This distinction has been drawn in both nonprisoners' and prisoners' rights cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Long v.
Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v.
Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
57Cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202 (2d
Cir. 1971).
68See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 29
(5th Cir. 1964); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 821
(3d Cir. 1968). But see Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d
1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971) ("While [Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961)] if read narrowly, may be
treated as an equal protection case, [Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546 (1964)] c6rtainly proceeds on the broader
basis of the first amendment.").
59 Cf. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir.
1968).
60See id. Equal protection questions are raised when
prisons refuse entry only to ministers with criminal
records, as a result of blanket rules against visits by exconvicts. These rules are commonly justified on both
rehabilitative and security considerations. Such rules
would affect, in all but rare instances, Muslim ministers
only, and therefore the Muslim flock. A New York
court ruled in a related case that if some ministers
were to be fingerprinted, considerations of equal protection required that all ministers be fingerprinted.
SaMarion v. McGinnis, 35 App. Div. 2d 684, 314
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1970). A similar question arises when
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In both Walker v. Blackwell6 and Long v.
Parker62 Black Muslim inmates were required to
prove unequal protection of the law in order to succeed in having the courts order prison administrators to grant Muslims the right to certain previously prohibited religious activities. In Long the
court required that in order to gain the right to receive Muhammad Speaks, a Muslim weekly, complainants had to show that the publication "is basic
religious literature essential to their belief in and
understanding of their religion" and also that "the
receipt of literature of similar [religious] relevance
is permitted prisoners of other faiths." 3 Even
after proving the religious importance of receiving
Muslim inmates are refused permission to write to
their religious leader Elijah Muhammad. Courts have
generally allowed inmates to write to other spiritual
leaders. In Walker the court ruled that the letters must
be sent to the Muslim leader, based on its finding that
Elijah Muhammad, if he had ever been a prisoner,
had not been in prison for over 25 years and had in
any event led an exemplary life during that period of
time.
Services must be permitted equally for all religions,
though the time and frequency may be controlled in
light of security considerations. See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Cruz
v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd per curiam, 445 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971) (inmates, as distinguished from clergy, might be prevented from conducting their own religious services, so long as inmates of
other religious sects were also prevented from doing
so). Protected religious services constitute the only
court-approved right to inmate assembly to date.
The right of inmates to wear religious medals has
received uneven treatment. Generally, they can be
outlawed entirely as dangerous, but prison officials
cannot discriminate among medals of various religions.
See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, (5th Cir. 1969);
Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Fulwood
v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). Though
no court has expressly so stated, the wearing of religious
medals is not considered a central requirement to most
religions, and therefore, the denial of such activity
constitutes only a mild restriction on first amendment
rights. Bibles, however, must be allowed in the institutions; this is true even of the controversial Koran.
Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969);
Northernv. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971). However, it might
be considered permissible for officials to restrict circulation of the Koran to Muslims if it is felt that more
general circulation might create a "clear and present
danger." See notes 127-45 infra and accompanying text. While bibles may actually be more dangerous than religious medals as weapons of destruction, (bibles are more useful than are medals for stuffing
plumbing facilities or setting fires, the two most common
problems faced by prison maintenance staff) these
holy books must be made available to inmates, presumably because they are much more important to
religious exercise than are medals.
61411 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir. 1969).
62390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
63390 F.2d at 822.
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Muhammad Speaks and that prisoners of other
religious sects were permitted to receive similar
publications, under Long, inmates still would
not have the right to receive the publication if it
created "a clear and present danger of a breach
of prison security or discipline or some other substantial interference with the orderly functioning
of the institutions." 64
In Walker the court granted certain requested
rights to Muslims but refused them the right to
special after-sunset meals during the month of
December (Ramadan) and the right to listen to
daily radio broadcasts of Elijah Muhammad,
though other non-religious radio programs were
already broadcast to inmates during the same
hour. The court found that equal protection of
religions did not require that Muslims be allowed
either activity as "'there [was] no purposeful discrimination as among the various religious sects
in prison as to diet,'" 65 and no similar religious
radio programming was being directed at other
religions. 5 The court further justified the two restrictions based upon very general allegations of
prison officials that both activities would cause
security problems and increase the cost of running
the prisons.
The Walker and Long courts seem wrong in their
requirement that equal protection be the sole
basis for religious freedom in prison. The Fourth
Circuit in Brown v. Peyton' 7 specifically stated that
religious freedom for prisoners need not be based
on equal protection considerations. Outside of
prison, the first amendment has been held to pro14Id. (footnote omitted).
Is 411 F.2d at 26.
66 The treatment by the court of the question of the
importance of the denied rights to the practice of
Islam is most interesting. Special meals at Ramadan
were dismissed as "those minor restrictions on the
practice of the faith of Islam." 411 F.2d at 26. No
expert testimony is stated on the importance of this
practice to the religion. Presumably the JudaeoChristian court made a reasoned decision on the subject. As to the radio program, the court held that
"petitioners have failed to show that the broadcast was
essential to the spiritual well-being of the petitioners,
rather than merely a source of '... spiritual rest and
consolation and inspiration...' to them." 411 F.2d at
28. The distinction seems a fuzzy one. Compare Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1971),
affirming the right of inmates to wear Martin Luther
King medals. The court regarded "as an intrusion of a
prisoner's First Amendment rights the granting of
possession of some medals and not others, contingent
upon their meeting an official standard of orthodoxy."
6 437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971). See also
Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 824-25 (D. Neb),
affd sub nom. Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th
Cir. 1971).

tect all religious activity not otherwise harmful
to society.' s
Even accepting the limitation, however, the
Long and Walker courts have interpreted equal
protection too narrowly. Merely testing whether
other religions have been granted the right to the
same type of activity is not sufficient. All religions
have different practices; the Muslim religion is
quite different from Christianity. As Christianity
has no dietary restrictions comparable to those
required by Islam, it is not surprising that Christians in the institutions had not been granted similar special dietary privileges. 9 The better test for
equal protection of religion would be equal protection of those activities that play an equally
important role in the practice of each religion, even
if the activities themselves are in no other way
analogous. The Muslim activity might be denied
only if it presented a much greater security or administrative problem than the comparatively important Christian activity. 70
In Barnett v. Rodgers,5 ' a case involving Muslim
dietary laws, the test for the constitutionality of
restrictions on religious activities of inmates was
set forth as a balancing of state versus individual
interests. The court stated that because religious
freedoms are so important in our society, only a
f"compelling state interest" is sufficient to justify
restrictions on religious practice.

The state interest in rehabilitation is never a
reason for limiting religious activity of inmates,

IsSee, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940).
19The court in Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1969), said:
"[Prison officials] stated that menus are prepared
without regard for other religions as well, explaining that the usual serving of fish for one meal
on Friday is not 'just for Catholics. It's just a
tradition,
the same as turkey for Thanksgiving.'
70
In Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th
Cir. 1968), Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964), and Cruz v.

Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 445 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971), valid disciplinary
and security reasons were found to justify restrictions
on the practice of non-Christian faiths. On this question not only expert witnesses but commonly known
facts should be considered as well. In Walker v. Blackwell, a mere assertion that movement of Muslims to
after-sunset meals during Ramadan (December) presented security and expense problems was accepted
by the court. 411 F.2d at 25-26. The court did not
consider the fact that in December sunset is quite
early and the time of supper may already be close
to sunset. Perhaps all that was involved was having
all inmates brought down a few minutes later for
that month. This might involve some scheduling
changes for guards, but these should be required if the
religious activity is an important one.
71410 F.2d 995 (D.C Cir. 1969).
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as such activity is thought to play a positive rehabilitative role. 2 Nor under the least restrictive
means test may deterrence and retribution be
achieved through limiting religious activity of inmates, as these goals of the criminal law can be
equally well achieved by prison officials without
restricting such constitutionally protected inmate
activity.
Only the state interests in restraint, internal institutional order, and the minimization of administrative costs, remain as the possible bases for limitations on inmates' religious activity. Under the
balancing test, these interests must be weighed
against any corresponding infringements on religious rights. On the questions of security and internal institutional order, Barnett, quoting from
Sherbert v. Verner," stated that "'[O]nly the
gravest abuses [of religious activity], endangering
paramount interests' can engender permissible
limitations on free exercise." 74 Barnett held that,
in addition, the State must prove that "'no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights.' "76 Like Barnett, Rowland v. Sigler 76 placed
the initial burden on the state to prove a "compelling" security interest necessitating restrictions
on religious practice "beyond those inherent to the
mere fact of imprisonment." ' To meet this burden, prison administrators should demonstrate
that each restriction is directly and substantially
related to compelling security interests.
Using the above formulae courts should uphold
far fewer restrictions on the religious practices of
inmates based on claimed security requirements.
Rather, religious activities might be limited as to
time, place, size of group and perhaps group composition, but not prohibitedY
Several courts have accepted the state interest
in reducing the expense of prison administration
as a justification for limiting inmate religious
activities. 9 In Walker, for example, the court sus72
See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
73374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
77 410 F.2d 1000 (footnotes omitted).
5Id., quoting from Sierbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at
407.
76327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd sub nom. Rowland
v. 77
Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 824. See note 43 supra.
78
It might be necessary in certain situations to refuse
attendance to those obviously antagonistic to a particular religion. Cf. Shakur v. McGrath, No. 69 Cr.
4493 (S.D.N.Y. Mem. Dec. 31, 1969) (limiting circulation of Black Panther newspaper to Panther members
only).

79See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th
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tained the refusal of authorities to provide inmates with pork-free meals during Ramadan partially because of the extra expense involved. However, future courts, using a balancing of interests
test, should find that few limitations on free exercise are constitutionally justified by financial considerations: The state interest in such budget restrictions should rarely rate the label of "compelling."
Even if the state interest in minimization of
prison expenses is a justification for some limitation
on free exercise, no court has yet addressed the
legal consequences of the fact that in many of our
jails and prisons the Muslim religion is a very
popular, if not the most popular, religion among
inmates. For example, it has been held that a
state need not provide a paid full-time chaplain
for every denomination 0 The courts have held
that such expense would be inconsistent with the
interest of the state. But if Islam is the chief religion, it would seem that the one full-time paid
chaplain must be of that religion. The popularity
of the religion may also require greater state expenditures to accommodate' the needs of the imprisoned congregation than were required when the
religion was a minority one. 8'
The balancing of interests and least restrictive
means tests portend further expansion of inmate
religious rights. Though religious freedom has
already been given more judicial support than
other first amendment freedoms for inmates, further gains can be expected as courts scrutinize more
carefully official claims of security requirements
and budget restrictions. The chief beneficiaries of
such gains would be Black Muslims, a growing segment of our prison society, who have been subjected to many restrictions in the past.
.Establishment Clause
Courts have not yet directly faced the issue of the
constitutional rights of inmate atheists and agnostics. The Establishment Clause of the first amendment would seem to require that these inmates be
Cir. 1971); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th
Cir. 1969).
80 Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir.
1970).
81
Thus, while it has been held that at least some food
at all meals must be pork free, administrators have
not yet been ordered to provide a completely pork-free
diet. If the effect on the exercise of religion by the majority of the inmates is weighed against the small extra
cost, if any, of providing entirely pork-free meals, the
provision of such a diet would seem to be required.

1972]
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granted rights to freedom of movement, assembly, courts find an almost absolute right for inmates to
and visits for non-religious purposes equal to those correspond with courts free of censorship8 6
granted to other inmates for religious purposes.
Other early cases involving the right of inmates
To deny such rights to atheists and agnostics is for to send and receive mail have been based on equal
the state to greatly encourage religious activity, protection of religion and race. s Although these
because it is well known that prisoners are willing cases speak about first as well as fourteenth
to go to great lengths to have visitors or attend amendment rights, they are based primarily on
meetings in order to alleviate the prison monotony. earlier court decisions in the equal protection area.
Although the denial of these rights to atheists This line of cases, as well as a line of sixth amendand agnostics would encourage religious activity ment cases, provided an important bridge to recent
in general rather than participation in a particular cases which established a prisoner's right to correreligion,2 such an approach runs afoul of the Es- spondence based solely on the Free Speech Clause.
tablishment Clause because the state thus grants
Closely related to inmate communication with
important freedoms to inmates who practice a reli- courts, is inmate communication with attorneys,
gion while denying them to those who do not. The again involving both sixth and first amendment
unfairness of this approach is magnified by the fact rights. Although the right to counsel and the
that parole boards consider an inmate's religious special attorney-client privilege should play imactivity in determining fitness for release. This portant roles in this area, 9 courts for a long time
procedure not only encourages atheists and ag- have found a more limited freedom of communicanostics to practice the religions favored by parole tion for inmate-attorney correspondence than for
board members, but also may force inmates who court mail. 0 In many jurisdictions this remains
practice religions less represented on the board to the rule today. 9' The theory behind these restricswitch religions while in prison, thus violating both
1963), cert
denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964). Although Stiltthe Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of ncr
dealt with a prisoner's action brought under the
the first amendment.P
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court noted that
§1983 protects only federal constitutional and statutory
RIGHT TO INCOMING AND OUTGOING MAIL
rights. 322 F.2d at 315. The court summed up its feelings by noting that, "[R]easonable access to the courts
Courts have read the Free Speech Clause of the is basic to all other rights protected by the Act, for it is
first amendment to include the right to correspond essential to their enforcement." Id. at 316.
81 See, e.g., Meola v. Fitzpatrick,
F. Supp. 878,
with others. 4 The earliest cases protecting the 885 (D. Mass. 1971); Carothers v.322
Follette, 314 F.
mailing rights of inmates covered letters and Supp. 1014, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Coleman v.
papers sent to and from courts.8" Presently, many Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966).
Throughout the discussion herein, censorship refers
82
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962), the to the reading of inmate mail, whether or not material
Supreme Court stated that: "Neither the fact that the is withheld or deleted. This practice differs from a total
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact ban on all mail on the one hand, and mere inspection
that its observance... is voluntary can free it from the not including reading, on the other. See notes 109-11
limitations of the Establishment Clause...." And in infra and accompanying text.
Abinton School Dist. v. Shemp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
" See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29
(1963) ,the Court stated that "to withstand the stric- (5th Cir. 1969).
tures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secu13See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th
lar legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither Cir. 1968).
advances nor inhibits religion."
89The court in Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392,
'4The Supreme Court made clear its general disap- 394 (D. Mass. 1971), noted that the privileged nature
proval of such a result in Engel v. Vitale, where it said: of confidential communications between attorney and
"When the power, prestige and financial support of client was an incident of the right to counsel. See also
government is placed behind a particular religious Freeley v. McGrath, 314 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y.
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 1970).
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially ap9 An example is Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d
proved religion is plain." 370 U.S. at 431.
433, 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967), where
In a recent development, the court in Theriault v. the Court of Appeals upheld as "reasonable" the AppelCarlson, 334 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), prohibited late Division's limitation of an anti-censorship order
clergymen from submitting reports to the parole board regarding prisoner-attorney correspondence to matters
about inmates' religious activities, because such prac- relating to the legality of the prisoner's detention and
tices involved the government in violation of the neu- the treatment received. Id. at 437, 227 N.E.2d at 384,
trality it must observe with respect to religion. Such 280 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
91
practices compel inmates to participate in religious
See Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir.),
activity by punishing the non-believer.
cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967). The court, while agree8 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
ing with the trial judge that the actions of the prison
776, 786 (D.R,. 1970).
authorities in opening the prisoner's mail to his attor85 Cf. Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. ney and communicating the contents to the state attor-
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tions is that an attorney may sometimes be used
by third persons as a conduit for the transmission
of dangerous messages such as escape plans or for
the smuggling of contraband into the prison.
Some courts have been even more restrictive,
allowing deletion of all material not related to the
92
legality of an inmate's detention or treatment.
This is a particularly dangerous rule because the
censoring officer deciding on the legal relevance of
the letter is almost never an attorney, and the
extent to which seemingly general information
can be useful to an attorney in bringing meaningful
litigation may not be obvious to the layman.
Moreover, censoring officers are particularly sensitive to information critical of the conduct of the
prison administration, information which can be
especially important to prisoners' attorneys. 9
Recently, several courts employing the balancing of interests test have found that if the asserted
interest of the state in censoring inmate-attorney
correspondence is weighed against the associated
infringement of first, fifth and sixth amendment
rights of the inmate, such censorship must be
ended. 4 The likelihood of abuse of mailing privileges by attorneys would be small.95 In the words
of Judge Learned Hand, "the gravity of the evil
[must be] discounted by its improbability." 16 The
ney general were highly improper, held that such censorship was allowed by established law. See also Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965). The court there
upheld prison censorship of attorney-client prisonermail on a modification of the hands off doctrine and a
determination that the correspondence was not confidential.
9
1See Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 227
N.E.2d 383, 384-85, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (1967).
Cf. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
. Official abuse of the censorship right can take
many forms. In Rbinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81,
82-83 (W.D. Wash. 1970), letters to an inmate's attorney were withheld because they referred to "boundless"
acts of "oral sodomy" among inmates and thus violated
prison regulations against letters containing vulgar or
obscene matter or complaining about prison policies.
The court supported the activities of the prison authorities in the case:
The intercepted letters were withheld not for the
purpose of interfering with the attorney-client relationship, but because of extraneous comments contained therein that the defendants believed to be
otherwise objectionable and in violation of prison
regulations.
314 F. Supp. at 82.
94 See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir.
1972); Palmigiano v. Travisono,317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I.
1970).
95Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 789
(D.R.I. 1970) C"There is no logical nexus between
censorship of attorney-inmate mail and penal administration.")
96
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d
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problem of contraband can be met by exposing
incoming attorney correspondence to the least
constitutionally restrictive procedure sufficient to
avoid the potential abuse: permitting only that the
prison guard open the envelope and examine -its
contents in the presence of the inmate without
reading any matter therein.9 The possibility that
escape plans will be communicated in attorneyinmate correspondence is an unrealistic rationale
for mail censorship. Inmates and attorneys are
permitted private verbal consultation in almost all
prisons.9 8 If they were conspiring towards the
inmate's escape this mechanism would be available
despite censorship of their mail. 99
Weighed against the small likelihood of abuse is
the severe infringement on constitutional rights
caused by censorship of correspondence between
inmate and counsel.'00 Some courts have found
that the "chilling effect" on the voicing of legitimate complaints to counsel caused by this censorship is great even if censoring officers do not abuse
their role through arbitrary action. 0 ' The onus of
this censorship is even greater when it is considered
Cir. 1950), afg'd, 341 U.S. 491 (1951): "In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil',
discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
9 In Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392, 395 (D.
Mass. 1971), the prison guards were permitted only to
use a fluoroscope or a metal detector device, or to manipulate envelopes in order to search incoming attorney
mail for contraband. See also Smith v. Robbins, 454
F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972); Peoples v. Wainwright,
325 F. Supp. 402, 403 (1971). In Peoples the court
entered an order granting relief pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(d). The court expressly disclaimed a con-

stitutional ground for its order.
98 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776, 789 (D.R.I. 1970). The right to private consulta-

tion with counsel has been consistently supported by
the courts. See, e.g., Haas v. United States, 344 F.2d 56,

65 (8th Cir. 1965); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d
749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Cf. Smith v. Peyton, 276 F.
Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Va. 1967) (guard may be present
in attorney room but may not listen to conversation).
See also Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 691 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971).
99One court, however, has justified censorship of

attorney-inmate correspondence based on the very fact
that the confidential nature of the relationship can be
preserved through face-to-face consultation. Rhem v.
McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This
judicial position seems constitutionally unsound because indigent inmates are represented by public defenders, attorneys who because of heavy court schedules
have little time for client visits and must therefore
depend on written correspondence for confidential in-

formation.
100 Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 142 (N.D.
N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776,0 789 (D.R.I. 1970).
'1 See Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972).
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that much of the legal discussion between inmate
and prisoner will be in contemplation of possible
suit against the very administration responsible
for censoring the mail.10 2
In cases involving the more general mailing
rights of inmates, various courts have accepted
each of the underlying goals of the criminal lawrehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and restraint-as well as each of the purposes of prison
administration, as state interests or justifiable
purposes of imprisonment supporting censorship
practices.
Based on these claimed state interests, courts
have permitted extensive censorship of incoming
and outgoing mail. In addition, prison officials
have been granted broad discretion to refuse incoming publications." 3 However, greater future
Ilse by courts of the balancing of interests and
least restrictive means tests, including closer
judicial scrutiny in determining the true nature
and level of the state interest in censorship, should
lead to court-enforced reduction or cessation of
present prison censorship practices.
Courts have justified restrictions on mailing
rights of inmates as appropriate to the goal of rehabilitation,"' despite the opinions of several leading penologists cited in recent cases 05 that the
state interest in rehabilitation actually warrants
102In the past one administrator was so bold as to
state that the reading of outgoing inmate mail was
necessary for proper preparation for future inmate suits.
See Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionalityof
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 795, 806 n.62, 823 (1969).
Another administrator made copies of all such attorneyprisoner letters and sent them to the state attorney
general. Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied,
389 U.S. 865 (1967).
13
The New York State rule reads: "Newspapers,
magazines, and books approved by the Warden may be
received by an inmate provided his behavior is good."
NEW YoRE STATE DEPARTMENT

OF CORECTIONS,

ImDATEs' RurE BooK 14 (1961), cited in Turner, Es-

tablishing the Rule of Law in Prison: A Manual for
Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STA. L. REv. 473, 485
n.80 (1971).
1 See, e.g., Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp.
246 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd sub nora. Long v. Blackwell,
351 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1965), vacated, 384 U.S. 32 (1966),
on renand, sub non. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d
Cir. 1968); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302, 303
(I.D.
Pa. 1958). See also cases cited in note 33 supra.
105 See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209,212 (D.
Mass. 1971) (testimony of Dr. Lloyd Ohlin), quoted
infra in text accompanying note 156; Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.L 1970). Other
penologists agree. See, e.g., H. BARNEs & N. TEETERS,
NEW HomizoNs IN CRBMNOLOGY 492 (3d ed. 1959). See
also G. Szs, TAE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVEs 122-29
(1958); Comment, PrisonerCorrespondence,62 J. Calm.
L. C. & P.S. 40 (1971).

expansion of opportunities for inmates to communicate with the outside world. Furthermore, no
court has struck down the regulations common to
most prisons which limit the number of correspondents to whom a prisoner may write or from
whom he may receive mail.1 Not only are the
number of correspondents limited, but also prison
officials must approve individual correspondents.1 0 Courts have approved the first restriction
as necessary to keep down the cost of censoring
inmate mail. The latter restriction is thought to
provide prison officials with a mechanism for preventing inmates from corresponding with those on
the outside who might deter rehabilitation, as well
as aid escape or send contraband.
A number of considerations militate in favor of
striking down general mailing restrictions on the
ground that they actually interfere with postrelease success. An inmate must contact many
people in anticipation of his release. The most
obvious of these are possible employers, persons
running school programs, rehabilitative programs
or drug programs, and former acquaintances who
can be helpful in these areas. Administrative roadblocks will dissuade many inmates from pursuing
these several paths to possible post-release adjustment. Most of these men md women have met
with frustration in trying to set up a stable life on
the outside before. If an important purpose of imprisonment is to lead offenders away from future
criminal activity, impediments to communication
with persons on the outside who could help them
to do so seems clearly counterproductive. Nor is
the likelihood of successful reacclimation enhanced
when the inmate is isolated from the outside world
in which his problems arose and is instead forced
to concentrate on the artificial world of prison.
This isolation makes it impossible for the inmate
to learn to react in more constructive ways to his
former environment.1 08 All of this suggests that the
106 See Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972-73 (8th Cir.
1965). Often the number of letters is controlled too. In
United States ex rd. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th
Cir. 1965), the maximum number of letters that a prisoner might have in his cell was limited to fifteen for
fire107prevention purposes.
See Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (AL.D. Pa.
1958). See also cases cited in note 109 infra,
101If, for example, a source of strain for him has been
domestic problems, he cannot try to work them out
before release if he is isolated from his family during
that period. Relatively unhindered communication
would allow the inmate to work out the problem with
his family before he returned to the street. The return
to his family would of course provide him with an important anchor upon release. The present system of
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state interest in rehabilitation should be weighed
in the balancing test on the side of greater mailing
rights for inmates.
More specifically, few courts have ordered an
end to the regulations in force in many prisons
prohibiting an inmate from writing to any exoffender.10 9 This blanket rule has been justified on
the theory that other ex-offenders will be a bad
influence on the inmate. It is absurd, however, to
deny to an inmate, on rehabilitative grounds, the
opportunity to communicate with ex-offenders on
the outside while at the same time forcing him to
live with hundreds of recently convicted men in
the closest of circumstances-circumstances in
which the first offender is often housed with
multiple offenders; the petty criminal with the
professional criminal. The claimed state interest is
simply not realistically served in such an instance." 0 This and similar irrationalities are not
lost on the inmates. Such restrictions are also
probably counterproductive from the point of view
of rehabilitation in that they teach inmates the
inconsistent nature of the law and consequently a
disrespect for authority."'
Closely related are limitations on inmate mailing rights based on administrative considerations,
which also have a negative impact on rehabilitation. Many prisons, for example, do not allow an
inmate to conduct a business while he is incarcerated,'1 ' no matter how legitimate the business
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may be. The justifications for this restriction range
from refusal to allow inmates in pursuit of personal
gain to cause expenditure of prison monies (such as
the time of officers to censor the letters) to a fear
that the conduct of a profitable business will provide the inmate with money to buy favors from
guards and other inmates."' The former argument
is weak at best: if the censorship itself is unnecessary there is no cost to the state. The latter justification for such restriction is invalid under the
least restrictive means test. Disallowing all business correspondence is not the constitutionally
least restrictive method of avoiding the feared
abuse: it would be sufficient to simply limit the
money that an inmate is allowed to bring into the
prison; the inmate could deposit the remainder on
the outside for post-release use. As the availability
of money and a business position are so important
to the post-release success of the ex-offender, there
is actually a strong state interest in encouraging
legitimate business interests among inmates.
Two other goals of the criminal law, retribution
and deterrence, may be served by restricting
inmate mailing rights. Again, however, because
these goals can be equally well achieved by other
means, the least restrictive means test requires
that the goals not be achieved by such constitu4
tionally burdensome restrictions."
Of the four underlying goals of the criminal law,
only security (restraint) remains as a state interest
which might possibly justify restrictions on inmate
mailing rights." 5 Mail restriction and censorship
practices have been justified as necessary to detect
escape plans and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into the prisons. The likelihood of
detecting escape plans in inmate correspondence
would appear to be slim, the more so since such
plans could be communicated during visits which

isolation followed by release may be one reason for the
generally high recidivism rates found in many studies.
109 See, e.g., Desmond y. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp.
246 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd sub noma.Long v. Blackwell,
351 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1965), vacated,384 U.S. 32 (1966),
on remnand, sub nom. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816
(3d Cir. 1968). This can be an important restriction on
the first amendment rights of an individual who has
numerous acquaintances who, living in the poorer
urban areas, have accumulated a criminal record. It is
now the federal rule that a criminal record is only one Cir. 1951). See also Hartung & Floch, A Social-Psychofactor in approving a correspondent. Walker v. Black- logical Analysis of Prison Riots: An Hypothesis, 47 J.
well, 411 F.2d 23, 29 (5th Cir. 1969).
CRi. L. C. & P. S. 51 (1956).
1 Comment, supra note 28, at 420.
110The total ban is not justified by security consid114Moreover, retribution and deterrence, the punierations because mere censorship, see note 86 supra,
of mail from correspondents with criminal records would tive aspects of incarceration, should be determined by
satisfy state security interests.
the legislature and the court. "[A]ny further restraints
MSee Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th or deprivations in excess of that inherent in the sentence
Cir. 1968):
and in the normal structure of prison life should be
subjected to judicial scrutiny [as violations of due
[T]o the extent that prison regulations are designed
to teach the prisoners to live in conformity with the
process]." Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th
norms of society, the sporadic and discretionary
Cir. 1968). See also People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston,
enforcement of unreasonable regulations, it appears
9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961);
to us, is more likely to breed contempt of the law
Complaints of Convicts at 519-20.
than respect for, and obedience to it. Unrestricted,
115Several courts have come to this conclusion in dearbitrary and unlawful treatment of prisoners
ciding first amendment cases. See, e.g., Fortune Society
would eventually discourage prisoners from coopv. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
erating in their rehabilitation.
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971). Se'2United States ex rd. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d curity of guards and inmates are included as state in294 (7th Cir. 1954); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th terests in this discussion.
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are usually unmonitoredV18 Thus the state interest
in security, though an important one, is simply
not served to any great degree by restrictions on
inmate correspondence. Moreover, the bases for
such limitations must be weighed against the
important infringements on prisoners' rights associated with the censorship. The most important of
these infringements are the severe limitations on
the absolute number of letters and correspondents
made necessary by the administrative costs of the
censorship itself. However, if the state interest in
censorship is not great, the costs of maintaining
the system should not justify further restrictions
on mailing rights.
Contraband such as escape tools, weapons, and
drugs entering the prison would represent a threat
to security. However, the risk can be fully met by
having incoming mall inspected but not read. To
prevent abuses, inspections should be conducted
in the sight of the inmate receiving the letter.
The availability of censorship provides prison
personnel with the opportunity to read and censor
perfectly legal correspondence which contain statements that can be construed as critical of the prison
administration. The inmates' knowledge that
censorship exists will have an important "chilling
effect" on the thoughts they are willing to express
in outgoing correspondenceiu7 Thus, the practice
tends to isolate inmates from constructive contacts
with the outside world. Also, an important channel
for the reduction of inmate tension is dosed. To a
significant extent, therefore, harsh censorship
practices probably serve to hinder rehabilitation
of inmates and may actually increase security
problems within prisons. At best, the state interest
in censorship is unclear; the corresponding infringement on inmates' first amendment rights is severe.
18
While the court in Palmigiano v. Travisano'
1
16See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776#
791 (D.R.I. 1970). Moreover, in most institutions the
chance of escape is small enough, and the punishment
upon being caught great enough, to dissuade the vast
of inmates from trying.
majority
7
1 See Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970). See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965). The court in Carothers found that
criticism sent to those outside could hardly be a threat
to security or anti-rehabilitative. Indeed, the court
stated, "such comments, even if they momentarily
cause chagrin to prison officials, may act as a form of
healthy catharsis in the case of an introvert." 314 F.
Supp. at 1025.
Us 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970). Nor did the
court find that aspect of restraint involving protection
of the public from threatening letters from inmates an
appropriate basis for censorship: "Officials of the Adult
Correctional Institution have also taken it upon them-

questioned whether "the purposes of imprisonment" justified censorship of inmate correspondence and found "justification only for fewer
restrictions because total censorship serves no rational deterrent, rehabilitative or prison security
purposes," the court in Morales v. Schmidt' 9 went
even further, stating that prison rules denying any
"fundamental" rights require a most "compelling"
state interest. The court stated that the need for
internal discipline or the protection of guards, inmates, or administration would not by itself constitute such an interest: "if the functions of deterrence and rehabilitation cannot be performed in a
prison without the imposition of a restrictive regime not reasonably related to those functions, it
may well be that those functions can no longer be
2 0
performed constitutionally in a prison setting."
The *best rule would be no censorship or any
other limitation on outgoing mail. Incoming mail
should be inspected for contraband only.12' As the
administrative cost of such inspection should be
low, it should not necessitate further interference
with the rights of inmates.
Incoming Publications
A numbei of courts have ruled recently on
prisoners' rights to receive outside publications.
The court in Rowland v. Siglerm stated that the
first amendment protects an inmate's right to
receive ideas as well as to express them. In Fortune
Society v. McGinnis'2 ' the right of inmates to
selves to read and screen outgoing mail to protect the
public, including the courts, from insulting vulgar letters. This is not their function-they are not the protectors of the'sensibilities of the public which can protect
itself." Id. at 788. The court concluded:
[T]he reading of any outgoing mail is unnecessary
and in violation of the First Amendent rights of
the parties involved unless pursuant to a duly obtained search warrant, and in the absence of the
same no outgoing prisoner mail may be opened,
read, or inspected.
Id. at 791.
19 340 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The couirt
found that the amorous letters of an inmate to his
wife's sister were constitutionally protected.
120340 F. Supp. at -.
1The possibility would exist under such a system
that pornographic material might enter the prison. The
state interest, however, in avoiding this occurrence
does not justify the censorship of inmate mail which
would be necessary to prevent it. Indeed, the entrance
of such material might even play a positive role to the
extent it helped to reduce the level of sexual tension
among inmates. The pornography question more often
arises in the context of incoming publications, discussed
infra note 146 and accompanying text.
12 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), a.ff'd sub nor. Rowland
v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Payne
v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191,1193 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
123319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also God-

BARRY FOX

receive the newsletter of the society of ex-offenders
was upheld. The newsletter contained information
on prison reform, rehabilitation programs, and the
activities of the organization. After noting the
important nature of the right involved, and stating
that "[c]ensorship is utterly foreign to our way of
life, it smacks of dictatorship," the court, citing
several earlier decisions regarding the first amendment rights of prisoners, stated:
Only a compelling State interest centering about
prison security, or a clear and present danger of a
breach of prison discipline, or some substantialinterference with orderly institutional administration

can justify curtailment of a prisoner's constitutional rights.nA
The court thus refused to recognize rehabilitation,
deterrence, or retribution as state interests justifying restriction on inmates' first amendment rights.
Also, the court stated that the fact that the journal
criticized the prison administration was no reason
to ban or otherwise censor the publication. In the
words of the court:
Correctional and prison authorities. .. are not
above criticism, and certainly they possess no
power of censorship simply because they have the
power of prison discipline."1
Using language from Long v. Parker,"6 the court
stated that to justify the ban on the publication:
"(PIrison officials must prove that the literature
creates a clear and present danger of a breach of
prison security... or some other substantial interference with the orderly functioning of the institute."

"v

The evidence of danger would have to be more
than "mere speculation that such [literature] may
ignite racial or religious riots in a penal institution." 128

The court in Fortun Society found that the
state had not made a sufficient showing that the
win v. Jackson, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1969); Payne v.
Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
24 319 F. Supp. at 904.
12- Id. at 905.
126 390 F. 2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1968).
12 319 F. Supp. at 905.
m Id. The court in Long also stated that broad claims
that Muhammad Speaks was "highly inflammatory,"
or "[mere antipathy caused by statements derogatory
of, and offensive to, the white race fare] not sufficient
to justify the suppression of religious literature even
in a prison." 390 F.2d at 822.
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society's newsletter was a security risk. Though
the opinions of New York State prison officials
were held to be important, the experience of the
neighboring New York City prisons, which permitted inmates to receive the publication, was held
to have even greater probative value on the question of whether the publication posed a "clear and
present danger." 129
Despite the positive outcome of this case, continued used by courts of the "clear and present
danger" test to determine the availability of
publications to inmates seems ill-advised. First,
there is no hard evidence that any publication
constitutes a clear and present danger."' Faced
with the question as to whether a problem inmate
should be denied the right to Mvuhammad Speaks,
a journal which prison officials considered "racist,"
the court in Rowland v. Sigler"' stated:
Viewed in its entirety, the sum of the evidence is
that the plaintiff is and has been a belligerent and
uncooperative inmate, but nothing ties his attitudes to his race or his racial views. Only by
speculation can it be said that his receiving of
Muhammad Speaks would promote the attitudes
which the prison administration understandably
decries.ln
There is no doubt that inmates are subject to
unusually great tensions,"13 especially racial tension. Yet, the possibility seems equally as great
that such "political" publications will diffuse tension by creating greater inmate awareness of the
societal basis for these tensions, as that such
publications will trigger aggressive acts based on
34
that tension
"2 319 F. Supp. at 905. See Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d
1228,1231 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Owens v. Brierly, 452
F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1971); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp.
941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). If a publication might create a
danger from those hostile to its doctrine a less constitutionally restrictive means than banning the publication from the prison might be to limit its circulation
therein to those who adhere to the doctrine. See Shakur
v. McGrath, No. 69 Cr. 4493 (S.D.N.Y. Mem. Dec.
31, 1969).
110Of course the test has often been applied in nonprison cases as well. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
M 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd sub nora. Row-

land v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).

' Id. at 827.
I Thus it has been suggested that a "clear and

present" danger may exist in prison in situations in
which the danger would not be equally great outside
of prison. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Singer at 222; Comment,
supra note 28, at 414.
14 Cf. In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87

Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970). Many of the publications
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When racial tensions are responsible for discipline problems in prison the surest solution would
appear to be segregation of the races. Yet courts
have held such segregation to be constitutionally
impermissible despite the apparent state interest
involved. 35 In the case of banned publications the
connection between restrictions on constitutional
rights and a corresponding improvement in internal
discipline is much less clear than in the case of
segregation. There is no reason for courts to give
inmates' rights to freedom of speech any less protectiori than that presently given to their rights to
equal protection -and freedom from discrimination.
Indeed, this first amendment right deserves the
greatest protection. In a democratic society the
free expression and reception of all political points
of view serves the highest state interest. As the
court stated in Fortune Society, "[f]ree discussion
of the problems of society is a cardinal principal of
Americanism.. . ." I'll The importance of the right

to receive political publications of a controversial
nature was stressed by the Supreme Court in
Lamont v. Postmaster GeweraUn Incarcerated men
will almost certainly be faced with controversial
banned to date do not advocate violence. The New York
Times compiled the following list of reading banned in
various New York State prisons: "The Jefferson Bible,"
The Blackstone Law Course, Psychology Today, National Geographic, newsletters of the Mattachine and
Fortune Societies, Koestler's "The Ghost Machine,"
Gay's "The Enlightenment," Ferkiss' "Technological
Man," Kaslow's "The Changeless Order," Carlson's
"Moderm Biology," Matson's "Being, Becoming and
Behavior," Levitas' "Culture and Consciousness,"
Erikson's "Youth and Crisis," Levi-Strauss' "The
Savage Mind," Von Bertalanffy's "Robots, Men and
Minds," Moorehead's "The Fatal Impact," Friedman's
"To Deny Our Nothingness," Jung's "Man and His
Symbols," McLuhan's "Understanding Media," Lunger's "Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling," Bettelheim's
"The Empty Fortress," Lewis's 'LaVida," Silberman's
"Crisis in Black and White," Edwards' "The Rage of
India," Sinclair's "The Cry for Justice," and Zaidenberg's "The Emotional Self." N.Y. Times,-Dec. 12,
1971, § 7, at 47. Indeed, Fortune Society Newsletter and
Muhammad Speaks can be said to advocate rehabilitation.
135The court in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105,
109 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nor.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), stated:
Thus, the right of a prisoner not to be subjected
to racial discrimination is so paramount that it will
prevail over even a strong showing that racial segregation of inmates tends to lessen intramural
strife and disciplinary problems.
See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). But see
Stroman v. Griffin, 331 F. Supp. 226 (S.D. Ga. 1971);
Rentfrow v. Carter, 296 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1968)
(prisons can segregate inmates by race when racial
tensions cause an extremely dangerous situation within
the prison).
136319 F. Supp. at 905.
'3- 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

political ideas after release. It is, therefore, antirehabilitative to prevent the inmates from confronting these ideas in an environment in which
they can be digested and thought through
thoroughly.
Second, the "clear and present danger" test is
too vague and too likely to lead to the abuse of
important constitutional rights of inmates such as
equal protection and freedom of speech33s In
employing a vague test like "clear and present
danger," courts have not taken into account those
who will implement the test. Censorship officers are
usually lower-rank correctional personnel, most
often white. 39 They are almost always without
extensive training in penology. 40 Too often they
censor that which they would consider inappropriate reading 1 However, they have no recognized
sensitivity to the needs of people of a different
race and background. It is important to note the
words of a black federal judge facing the issue of
the appropriateness of permitting political literature into prison:
It is not a function of our prison system to make
prisoners conform in their political thought and
belief to ideas acceptable to their jailers ....
[Rather, the] function is to try to rehabilitate the
law-breaker by convincing him of the validity of
our legal system.'4
The present system of censorship does not do this.
Even if there were such a thing as ideas which
are a "clear and present danger," it is unrealistic to
think that banning certain publications or even
118See note 134 supra and note 141 infra. In the rare
case of a publication which merely explained excape
technique, prohibition would still be proper. Cf. Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas,
., dissenting).
rain Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 876
(1970), miodified sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), Judge Motley pointed out
that while seventy percent of the New York State
prison population were non-whites, only two percent

of the entire guard force was black or Puerto Rican,
and these few were assigned to inferior positions.
140In New York City, for example, guards receive
four weeks of training in which to learn all aspects of
correctional work. RuLES AND PRocEDuREs or TE
DEPA TMENT Or CORRECTION OF THE Crry OF N sw
Yoan § 3.126 (1966).
141See, e.g., list in note 134 supra. It is not an official
state policy which keeps out these books, but rather
the list is the result of decisionmaking in individual
institutions. See also Jack Newfield, "Prison Censors,"
Village Voice, Feb. 10, 1972, at 1, for examples of books
denied to inmates by individual censoring officers, Cf.
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 790 (D.R.I.
1970).
'4
Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 876 (S.D.
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censoring incoming mail will have more than a
marginal effect on the spread of such ideas within
the prison. For, as the court pointed out in Nolan v.
Fitzpatrick,43 "prisoners are quite well able to
proselytize directly." Official attempts to keep out
controversial literature probably does not improve
security, but rather reinforces the position of those
in the inmate society who already espouse those
controversial views. It also serves to teach inmates
disrespect for their jailers.
If the "clear and present danger" test is still to
be employed by courts, in the future they should
do so only in the context of the principles set out
by Professor Freund in On Understanding the
Supreme Court:'"
The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test
is an over simplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with
the value of the occasion for speech or political
activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has imposed; and
perhaps the specific intent with which the speech
or activity is launched. No matter how rapidly
we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' or
how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not
a substitute for the weighing of values. They tend
to convey a delusion of certitude when what is
most certain is the complexity of the strands in

the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle.' 45

Closely related to the above is the question of
allowing inmates to receive or possess pornography.
At the very least, censorship must be more specific
than a general ban on "obscene" literature. That
standard would provide correctional personnel with
the opportunity to abuse the censorship regulations
by violating the rights of prisoners to receive
political and literary publications. At least one
court, wishing to avoid such abuse, has limited
censorship only to those publications failing to
meet obscenity standards set out by the Supreme
Court.

146

N.Y. 1970) (Motley, J.), modified sub nom. Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
'3'

451 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1971).

144P. F auzD,
CouxT (1949).

ON UNDERSTANDING

THE

SUPREME

4 Id. at 27-28.
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 79091 (D.R.I. 1970), suggested use of the test enunciated
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), because
146

later Supreme Court tests would be difficult for prison

personnel to follow. The court criticized the system
then in use:
Defendant officials have given an untrained custodial officer unbridled discretion to screen out
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To date, the various standards, including the
balancing of interests test as employed by most
courts to determine the constitutionality of
censorship practices, have been insufficient on
at least two counts. Though courts now require
officials to associate each restriction on inmate
correspondence with a specific "underlying
consideration" or "compelling" state interest,
many courts have not gone so far as to consider
whether the restriction will actually serve the
associated penological goal in any meaningful way.
Indeed in many instances the restrictions may
actually have important negative impacts on
achieving penological goals. Nor have courts considered the likelihood that the availability of the
restriction will be abused by the prison staff. On
this last point they have not realistically considered
the level of personnel making many of the censorship decisions, nor indeed the lack of penological
training of prison officials in general.
Related Rights of Outside Correspondents
At least two courts m have recognized that the
first amendment rights of the outside correspondent, as well as those of the inmate, are infringed
upon by prison censorship rules. This recognition
has obvious importance---however appropriate
limitations on the constitutional rights of inmates
may be, the first amendment rights of free correspondents must be broad indeed. One court'4' has
recognized that the broad rights of the press to
circulate printed material includes the right to
send such material into prisons.
RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR

REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES

Several courts have granted prisoners an absoany material which in his subjective opinion he
believes to be pornographic. This, of course, is not
a legitimate method of preventing hard core pornography
from entering the [prison].
47
1 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786
(D. R. I. 1970). See also Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, 657 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("Interruption of mail
to public officials infringed upon ... the right of legislators
to be informed.")
4
1 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786
(D. R. I. 1970). Compare Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F.
Supp. 1128 (W.D.N.Y. 1971). (The court rejected the
claim of newsmen that their constitutional rights
were infringed by denial of their request to the At-

tica Superintendent for permission to interview inmates so that they might get all sides of the story
for the public), sith Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst,-F. Supp.-(D.D.C. 1972) (blanket denial of
press request to interview inmates held unconstitutional as abridging the public's right to know).
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lute right to send letters to public officials.'l These
decisions have been based on the first amendment
clause guaranteeing the right to petition for redress
of grievances. A recent First Circuit decision,
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,5 extended this inmate right
to include letters sent to the press and media.
While the district court's decision in Nolan"' was
based primarily on the right to petition for redress
of grievances, the court of appeals based its
decision on freedom of the press as well. However, the root justification for both decisions was
really the same--the need of inmates to let the
public know about conditions within our prisons.
The district court held that:
[Inmates] have the right to appeal for redress of
grievances not only to the courts and to the
elected and appointed representatives of the
people, but to the people themselves, and... such
people are best reached by communications with
the news media....

[Slome grievances of prisoners may be legitimate
and yet may not be within the potential practical
political achievements of a governor and of a legislature without an increased sensitivity and awareness in the part of the general public .... 15
The court of appeals expanded on this last theme:
[W]e rely primarily on the fact that the condition
of our prisons is an important matter of public
policy as to which prisoners are, with their wardens,
peculiarly interested and peculiarly knowledgeable.
The argument that the prisoner has the right to
communicate his grievances to the press and,
through the press, to the public is thus buttressed
by the invisibility of prisons to the press and the
public: the prisoners' right to speak is enhanced by
the right of the public to hear. This does not depend upon a determination that wardens are unsympathetic to the need to improve prison condiditions. But even a warden who pushes aggressively
for reforms or larger appropriations within his department and before appropriate officials and
legislative committees may understandably not
feel it prudent to push for more public laundering
of institutional linen."'

The First Circuit also ruled in Nolan that the
149See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.

776, 788-89 (D.R.I. 1970). This is the rule in federal
prisons. See Turner, supra note 103, at 478 n.32.
1 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
1 1326 F. Supp. 209 (D. Mass. 1971).

151
Id. at 216. Although the court of appeals reversed
the district court, it did so on the grounds that the
district court's guidelines still left the warden too much
discretion to limit such mailing of letters to the press.
113451 F.2d at 547-48. See also Washington Post Co.
v. Kleindienst,-F. Supp.-(D.D.C. 1972).

claimed state interest in minimizing the expense of
administration did not justify the refusal of prison
officials to approve the requests of inmates to send
letters to the press:
A flat ban on all letters to the press is obviously
inexpensive to administer. It requires little of the
censor's time to stamp "Rejected" on a letter, and
prison officials need not spend time responding to
issues which these letters raise. But on the present
facts, the state interest in minimizing expenses
does not rise to the level of an "important or substantial" interest. 5 1
The court also denied the claims of prison
officials that state interests in deterrence, retribution, restraint or rehabilitation justified the restrictions on inmate attempts to correspond with
the press. Indeed, both the district and appellate
courts found that allowing inmates to post such
letters served several positive penological goals.
The writing of such letters might be rehabilitative
to the men involved. At the same time it would
diffuse inmate hostility if the men knew that the
public could become aware of their grievances
through means other than riots.' 5 On these points
the district court quoted testimony of Professor
Lloyd Ohlin of Harvard Law School who stated
that although he could not be sure whether prisoner-press correspondence is a "good or a bad thing
from the penological viewpoint," due to the total
lack of research on the subject, he did feel that:
[Tihere is a good chance that letting prisoners correspond with newspapers and broadcasters would
facilitate prison discipline by providing prisoners
with a nonviolent and effective outlet for their
grievances. 15
Professor Ohlin further suggested that if the
public were sensitive to prison conditions, prison
reform might even be forthcoming as result of
those letters.
As to the applicability of the twin state penal
interests of retribution and deterrence to the ban
on letters to the press, the First Circuit noted that:
IT]he important question is not whether this ban
may conceivably have a deterrent or retributive
effect, but whether the use of this ban is essential
15 451 F.2d at 549-50. See also Brenneman v. Madigan,55-

F. Supp. -

(N.D. Cal. 1972).

1 But cf. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.
1966) (court refused to overrule the punishment meted
out to a prisoner for posting within the prison a copy
of a letter that he had sent to the governor stating the
prisoners' grievances and urging prison reform).
156 326 F. Supp. at 212.
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to achieving those effects. In holding that prisoners
retain certain rights in prison, the courts have
implicitly held that certain deprivations are not
essential to the furtherance of these purposes: the
argument which would justify all rules proves too
much. Lacking evidence that the deprivation which
a ban on letters to the press imposes is essential to
deterrence or retribution, we told that it is not. A
similar "all-rules" argument as to rehabilitation,
that prisoners must learn to follow rules in order to
become acceptable members of society, is similarly
unpersuasive. 15 7
Thus, as in the case of inmate letters to public
officials, no state interest in either the goals of the
criminal law or in the purposes of prison administration were found to be compelling enough to
justify the placing of restrictions on inmate letters
to the press.
IN1TEATE AUNUSCRIPTS

Many prisons have regulations prohibiting or
limiting the rights of inmates to write or publish
manuscriptsjis Again, the rationale for such regulations must be rooted in a legitimate state interest.
The fear most commonly voiced by courts in support of such an interest is that an inmate manuscript circulated among fellow inmates could
threaten the security of the prison. In Sostre v.
McGinnis,'59 the Second Circuit indicated that
prison officials might seize a manuscript if limitations on circulation proved unenforceable and if
157451 F.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
us See, e.g., United States v. Maas, 371 F.2d 348

(D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.
App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959). The New York City
regulation on inmate manuscripts is fairly typical:
No manuscript prepared by any inmate shall
be permitted to leave any institution until it has
been reviewed and approved by an employee or
committee as the head of institution shall designate. No manuscript shall be cleared for mailing
if it contains:
a. Plagiarized material.
b. Any libelous, lewd or pornographic material.
c. Any material criticizing any governmental,
judicial or law enforcement agency or institution or any personnel connected therewith.
d. Any material which appears to glorify crime
or delinquent conduct or which deals with the
technique of committing crimes.
e. Any material which might be offensive to any
race, nationality, religious faith, political
party or other group of citizens.
f. Reference to the fact that the writer is an
inmate of a correctional institution.

RuLEs

AND

PROCEDURES oF

THE

DEPARTMENT OF

CoRRacrnoN oF NEw YoRx CrrY § 4.199 (1966).
159
442 F.2d 178, 202 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the manuscript presented a "clear and present
danger."
Such apprehension over the circulation of a
manuscript throughout the inmate population
hardly justifies a complete prohibition against
inmate writing. First, as in the case of incoming
publications, few, if any, manuscripts will present
a danger to security and discipline sufficient to
justify seizure. Second, even if a manuscript were
to pose too great a threat to security to be circulated throughout the prison, there is no state
interest which justifies prohibiting manuscripts
from being mailed to the outside for publication.
Indeed, the publication of inmate literature could
serve as a source for redressing prison grievances
and at the same time help to reduce inmate tensions.
No other state interest is served by limiting inmate writing; in fact, the state interest in rebabiitation may be served by such activity. Also,
as in the case of censorship of incoming publications, the seizure of inmate manuscripts will do
little to prevent inmates from communicating the
ideas contained therein; official seizure may indeed be the best means of promoting these ideas.
In total, the marginal increase in inmate tensions
created by the possibility that a "dangerous"
manuscript will be circulated does not seem comparable to the importance of the restricted right.
This is especially true when the likelihood of
official abuse, including the prohibition or seizure of
manuscripts merely critical of prison conditions,
is considered in the balance.
SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY

No prisoners' rights to non-religious speech or
assembly have yet been recognized by courts
reviewing inmate complaints. These two first
amendment rights are, of course, closely linked,
especially in prison. There, severe restricitions on
freedom of movement often makes speech with
even one other chosen person difficult. These
restrictions are based on the belief that the chief
concerns of prison administrators and the state
interests most often recognized by courts-restraint and security of guards and prisoners--are
closely related to restrictions on inmate movement. Courts are, therefore, very hesitant to order
the greater inmate movement that would be
necessary for even limited assembly and speech.
Courts have found, however, a right to speech
and assembly when religious practice is involved 0
160 Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969);

1972]

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Similarly, many courts, including the Supreme
Court, have declared constitutionally protected the
right of one prisoner to receive legal help from
another when professional counsel is not sufficiently available 6 While both of these rights may
be reasonably limited as to time and location based
on security considerations, neither can be denied.
Recent decisions concerning inmate correspondence have stated that the inmate's right to free
speech is no less a "preferred constitutional right"
than is freedom of religion or right to counsel. This
has always been true outside of prison.162 A prisoner's right to non-religious or non-legal speech
should warrant no less judicial protection than its
less secular counterparts. The state interest in
restricting more general inmate speech is not any
greater than it is for religious speech; surely the
security considerations are the same. Courts have
also begun to recognize that non-religious speech
can be just as important to rehabilitation as is its
religious counterpart. As one court recently stated:
[WVle doubt whether preparation of a prisoner for
return to civilian life is advanced by deadening
his initiative and concerns for events within the
prison itself.16
Inmate communication within prison may serve
as a model for relationships after release.
The least restrictive means doctrine would require
accommodation of security interests with first
amendment rights, as is done in the case of religious assembly, rather than permitting a total ban
on inmate speech and assembly. 4 For example,
Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); Long v.
Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate,
382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334
F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964);
Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
afT'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971); Glenn v. Wilkinson,
309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Knuckles v. Prasse,
302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Banks v. Havener,
234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
' See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Beard v. Alabama Board of Corrections, 413 F.2d 455
(5th Cir. 1969); cf. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.,
a.ff'd per curiam sub nor. Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971).
i- See note 49 supra.
163Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp.
1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court in Sobe rejected the
claimed state interests in restricting the rights of
parolees to free speech and assembly. The decision is
particularly relevant because the court in reaching its
conclusions assumed the fundamental issues of constitutional law to be the same for parolees as for prisoners. See contra, Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084
(10th
1 4 Cir. 1972).
1 See note 78 supra.

inmate assembly might be limited to protected
areas when sufficient correctional manpower were
available. At other times printed material might
be circulated in lieu of speech and assembly.
Courts must begin to put to the closest scrutiny
limitations on inmate speech and assembly justified by prison administrators as necessary to
security. 6 5 Prison officials are concerned with
maintaining security almost to the exclusion of
other interests. Their conservatism on this issue is
understandable; they are in the news only when
escapes, riots, or inmate deaths occur. Success in
other penological areas is more subtle, less visible,
and therefore almost never rewarded. Because of
this, it is necessary for the courts to be especially
zealous in protecting inmate speech and assembly
by demanding that prison officials use means which
least restrict inmate first amendment rights while
maintaining the security of guards, inmates, and
the public.
An equally important prisoners' right is that of
verbal communication with those on the outside.
To date, courts have condoned severe limitations
on the permitted numbers of visits and visitors,
realizing the difficult logistical and security problems involved in moving inmates to the visiting
room and observing their behavior therein. In
many prisons only visits by close relatives are
permitted, and it is not clear from opinions to date
whether courts consider even these visits to be
constitutionally protected. 66
The right to receive visits, like the right to
receive mail, is a most important one from a
rehabilitative as well as a constitutional point of
view. Many of the arguments supporting expanded
mailing rights also support broader visitation rights
as well. 67 Inmate tensions are generally reduced
with increased visits, and the chances for successful inmate reintegration after release are generally
enhanced.16' As in the case of inmate assembly,
165Cf. Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
161Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257 (D. Neb.
1971) (visits of half sister of inmate not constitutionally
protected).
167
See generally notes 84-157 supra and accompanying text. It is important to note that many new prison
facilities are being built far from population centers.
This represents a very real restriction on the visitation
rights of those on the outside who are interested in the
rron. The constitutionality of locating prisons far
om urban population centers is particularly called
into question by the fact. that this situation interferes
far more with visitation opportunities for the poor,
than
for the non-poor.
16' See Comment, supra note 28, at 418. Nor should
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courts must challenge claims by prison officials
regarding the necessity of restrictions on visitation
when it is demonstrated that security considerations can be accommodated with fewer restrictions
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courts have ruled that detainees must be classified
more closely to accused individuals free on ball
constitutionally reinforced by the fact that in most
jails, but for the poverty of the accused, a large
69
on this important inmate right.
percentage of those detained would be free on bail
with no restraints."'
FIRST AmENDMENT RIGHTs or
, Some courts, without speaking of constitutional
DETENTION PRISONERS
classification as such, have employed a balancing
test of state versus individual interests 74 Because
Prison and jail officials in many jurisdictions
for pre-trial prisoners the only recognized state
have been restricting the first amendment rights
interests are restraint and the purposes of prison
of pre-trial prisoners as severely as the rights of
administration, all restrictions on first amendthose already convicted and sentenced. Only in
ment rights of detainees must be directly related
recent years have courts indicated that such treatto these interests 75 Restrictions on constitutional
ment of detainees is unconstitutional. In Hamilton
rights of detainees based on considerations of
v. Lovel the court, ruling on the constitutional
rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution are thererights of detainees, held:
fore unconstitutional. 76
Courts in recent years have listed many first
It is a fundamental constitutional tenet that those
amendment
rights which detainees retain in
similarly classified must be similarly treated, and
prison-rights not yet granted to sentenced inthat the system of classification itself must bear a
mates. Most reviewing courts have ruled that there
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.
must be no censorship of outgoing mail nor restricUnder the equal protection clause, it would not
seem possible to be able to classify detainees, awaittions on those to whom mail may be sent,"7 as
ing trial, in the same group with those persons who
-'2 Id. at 1192. See generally Note, Constitutional
have been convicted of crime and sentenced to
Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
prison. And yet, that appears to be what we have
YAlE L.J. 941 (1970).
been doing as a practical matter, not only locally,
"I In a recent survey in New York City it was estibut across the nation. Ironically, the lot of those
mated that on an average day in 1970, about 50 percent
detained while awaiting trial appears to be worse
of all detention inmates were held on bails under $1500.
J. Edelman, R. McLean, B. Schwartzfarb, A Profile of
than that of those convicted and serving their
New York City Correctional Inmates (May 1970)
sentences in the usual penitentiary systems. 17'
(Rand Institute, New York, N.Y.).
The Love court stated, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191:
Because they are presumed to be innocent,
As pointed out above, most of the inmates of the
Pulaski County jail are there because they do not
this communication be restricted because it is critical
have the financial resources to pay bondsmen the
of the prison administration. Such criticism may be an
necessary money to obtain their release. The testiimportant part of an inmate readjustment as it shows
mony revealed that there are in excess of 1300
it develops his critical capacity. At the same time it
persons awaiting trial in the state courts of Pulaski
may serve to reduce his anxieties, thus being an imCounty. Some 90 percent are free and walking the
portant aid to prison discipline as well. See Nolan v.
streets of this and other communities. Many of
Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209, 212 (D. Mass. 1971)
these, who are free upon bond, have criminal rec(testimony of Dr. Lloyd Ohlin). Indeed, an open chanords considerably worse than some of those who
nel for voicing criticism both within and outside of the
are presently in the Pulaski County jail. Nevertheinstitution has been suggested as the best means of
less, they are free because they had something
avoiding
riots. Id.
else: money.
69
' In considering expanded visitation rights in light
See also Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.
of security requirements, courts should take notice of
Pa.7 1964).
1 4See, e.g., Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1379
such supplemental forms of communication as telephones and closed circuit television, which provide a
(D. Conn. 1971).
communications link with those on the outside, while
175Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. at 1379; Davis v.
greatly reducing security problems. While these devices
Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
ought not to replace face to face visits for humanitarian
See also Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192
reasons, they could be used as a constitutionally accept(E.D. Ark. 1971); Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F. Supp. 684,
able supplement to such visits. Although the state
687 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
176Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. at 1379.
interest in prison security is understandably great, the
interest in maintaining prison costs at their present un"77
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 719 (N.D.
conscionably low level is less obvious; greater expendiOhio 1971). See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
tures necessary to improve inmate communication,
776, 791 (D.R.L 1970). But see Seale v. Manson, 326 F.
should be required in the future.
Supp. 1375, 1383 (D. Coan. 1971) ("unfettered mail
170328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
and visitation privileges will seriously hamper prison
M Id. at 1191.
security and discipline").
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the state has no interest in preventing detainees
from writing to those who might be thought to be
negative influences.' s At least one court has required that detainees be provided telephone calls
to and visits by friends and relatives.' The court
in Jones v. Witlenberg ruled that incoming mail to
detainees may be inspected for contraband only;
it may not be read.1 0 Only those incoming publications which would come clearly within the Supreme
Court's definition of pornography have been unanimously ruled out of pre-trial detention institutions.'3 Courts have thus granted detainees many
of the first amendment rights which this article
suggested should be granted to sentenced inmates
as well. i
I PLICATIONS OP THE DETENTION-

SENTENCE DICHOTOMY
Sentenced inmates should minimally be granted
all of the first amendment rights recently granted
to detainees. It is true that in addition to matters
of prison administration itself, the only explicitly
recognized state interest in imprisoning pre-trial
defendants is to ensure their appearance in court,
while sentenced inmates are imprisoned in order to
rehabilitate them, deter them from further crime,
and "punish" them in proportion to their crimes.
However, as pointed our earlier, penologists generally agree that expansion rather than restriction of
first amendment rights of prisoners best serves
178These cases have not explained why excape plans
are less of a problem with detainees. But see Conklin v.
Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971); Seale v.
Manson, 326 F. Supp. at 1383.
179Brenneman v. Madigan, - F. Supp. - (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
18"
330 F. Supp. 707, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
11Id. at 719-20. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317
F. Supp. 776, 789-90 (D.R.I. 1970) (incoming mail
from approved addressees may not be read; mail from
others may be read, but can be censored only for "highly
inflammatory writings and hard core pornography").
'' Ironically, pre-trial detainees have, in the past,
often been subjected to institutional conditions far
worse than those faced by sentenced inmates because
many detention facilities were originally planned for
smaller, shorter-term populations than they now contain. Sentenced institutions, because they are often
better equipped for visits and other inmate movement,
have provided sentenced inmates with greater opportunities to exercise first amendment rights than exist
for detainees. Several recent decisions, however, suggest
a future willingness of courts to order conditions in detention institutions improved if poor conditions interfere with the exercise of protected first amendment
rights of pre-trial prisoners. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love,
328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jackson v.
Hendrick, 11 BNA CRIM. L. REPTR. 2088 (Phila. County
Ct. Common Pleas, April 4, 1972) (court found entire
Philadelphia prison system unconstitutional).

rehabilitation. Retribution and deterrence though
perhaps served by directly restricting first amendment rights, are equally well served by other constitutionally less restrictive forms of punishment. 1"
Thus, only restraint and the purposes of prison
administration, including the security of inmates
and guards, remain as underlying considerations
for withdrawing first amendment rights from sentenced inmates.
Both detainees and sentenced inmates must
thus lose some first amendment rights, based solely
on considerations of prison administration and
security. As a practical matter however, the large
majority of the sentenced population, and particularly that segment with short sentences, would
seem to present fewer security problems than the
detention population. Prison administrators generally have much more information on sentenced
prisoners, including background data, psychological difficulties and potential dangerousness,
enabling them to better predict security risks.
Sentenced inmates are more certain of their term
of stay and are interested for the most part in
simply serving out their time. In many jurisdictions prisoners have the added incentive of possible
early release based on "good behavior" during
incarceration."3
Detainees, on the other hand, are generally uncertain about their future and face almost constant
pressure and anxiety caused by numerous court
appearances and plea bargaining sessions. Whereas
sentenced institutions have a fairly stable population, detention institutions have a high turnover
rate, with some men detained for many months and
many others out within a week. This means a constant influx of new pre-trial prisoners about whom
virtually nothing is known. Because detainees are
placed in detention only hours after arrest, they
may be undergoing drug or alcohol withdrawal, or
may be in shock or in an otherwise extremely upset
emotional state. Finally, at present, the sentenced
institutions, as compared to detention prisons,
usually provide inmates with facilities which are
less crowded, with less population fluctuation, and
with better medical and psychiatric care and better
social services support. These factors can mean
lower levels of inmate tension and frustration in
sentenced institutions. From a security and
restraint point of view, then, it would seem that
sentenced institutions should properly be no more,
183See note 105 supra.
" See, e.g., N.Y. CoRRFcroN LAW §§ 230, 230-a
(McKinney 1968).
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and perhaps even less, restrictive than should
prisons for pre-trial detainees. l7
Constitutional considerations have been held to
require that detained inmates should be free of
interference with outgoing mail, free of censorship
of incoming mail and publications, and should
have the right to expanded visiting privileges.
Since there is no greater state security, or other,
interest in denying these same rights to sentenced
men and there is no less infringement of important
constitutional freedoms if these rights are denied
to them, sentenced inmates should also be granted
these rights. There have as yet been no court
rulings granting detainees the rights to speech and
assembly within prison. As such rulings occur in
the future-and decisions to date would suggest
that such rights will be granted to detention
inmates first-these rights should be extended to
sentenced inmates.
SUMMARY

The balancing of interests and least restrictive means tests provide the proper standards for
the future expansion of inmate first amendment
rights within the context of actual institutional
security needs. Courts have moved in the right
sentenced men
185Groups of particularly "safe"
might be given even fuller first amendment freedom
under a classification system. (To some extent this is
now done by institutional assignment.) The main problem with such a system would be the likelihood of official
abuse via assignment of inmates to lower classification
for political or religious beliefs. Careful court scrutiny
might still make such a system feasible, however.
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direction in granting greater first amendment
rights to detainees; these greater constitutional
protections should be extended to sentenced inmates as well. Courts have granted both sentenced
inmates and detainees expanded rights to religious
assembly and speech; other first amendment rights
deserve equal protection. At the same time, courts
must begin to more carefully scrutinize security
claims of prison officials, and, in so doing, consider
the people making daily decisions involving inmate
rights and set out principles which are not easily
subject to abuse. 18
In considering inmate claims to greater first
amendment rights, reviewing courts should consider carefully the words justice Frankfurter wrote
in a similar context:
Freedom of expression is the wellspring of our civilization-the civilization we seek to maintain and
further.... The treatment of its minorities; especially their legal position, is among the most searching tests of the legal civilization attained by a society. It is better for those who have almost nnlimited
power of government in their hands to err on the side
of freedom. 187
State interests on many levels will be best served
by greater not lesser first amendment rights for
our incarcerated minority.
186 Courts also must apply the "least restrictive
means" test to all official actions justified as necessary
to security.
'1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 548-50
(1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (emphasis added).

